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There are many well-crafted vignettes in this
book, some excellent big pictures and perhaps
also a massive, wide screen production
struggling to be set free. For some years I used
cases described by Richard Cabot in his
Differentialdiagnosis(Philadelphia,1911)asthe
basis for student essays. These records are
succinctmodelsofclinicalinvestigationinwhich
Cabot employs all the laboratory and bedside
tools newly available to the early twentieth-
century physician to diagnose and treat his
patients. I asked students to compare them with
the recorded histories of consultations made by
an eighteenth-century doctor, usually the
Cumberland physician William Brownrigg.
1
Cabot’scasesareperfectforteachingmostthings
an undergraduate might be expected to know
about the history of relatively recent clinical
medicine. They are hospital-based and scarcely
anything can be learned of the patient’s way of
life save his or her occupation. Physical
examination, pathological anatomy, surgical
referral,themicroscopeandtheX-rayallappear.
The contrast with the case notes made by an
eighteenth-century doctor is quite marked.
Cabot, to all appearances, was a modern and a
principal one at that. The ‘‘sick man’’ has
disappeared from his histories in so far as Cabot
neverputsinwritinghowhishospitalpatientssay
they feel. In using Cabot in this way I generally
kept from the students my guilty secret—that I
was being unfair to Cabot—that there was more
to Cabot’s approach than mechanical medical
practice. It is quite well known that in various
other writings Cabot was at the forefront of the
movementthatresistedwhatwasdeemedclinical
reductionism and that was struggling to restore,
inGeorgeCanbyRobinson’sphrase,‘‘thepatient
as person’’.
2 Indeed Cabot’s later career saw a
retreatfromclinicalpracticeandhispursuitofthe
study of medical ethics.
In Christopher Crenner’s Private practice: in
the early twentieth-century office of Dr. Richard
Cabot I expected to meet my nemesis—a Cabot
who treated the whole person. Interestingly I’m
not sure I did, which is not to say I did not find in
here new interpretations of Cabot’s medical (and
personal) life. In his private practice, patients do
emerge much more fully but only because the
contingencies of private practice make richer
evidence available, not through any change in
Cabot’s clinical approach (the modern sense of
clinical as also meaning ‘‘impersonal’’ or
‘‘steely’’ is important here).
Cabot was born in 1868 into the most
illustriousofBostonfamilies.Throughouthislife
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247he was associated with Harvard University and
the Massachusetts General Hospital. He had a
large private practice at his office (it is hard to
imagine a British physician of this period having
an ‘‘office’’ with its business-like overtones).
Between1897and1926,Cabotsawthousandsof
patientsandmeticulouslyrecordedhisversionof
the encounters. Previously unexplored, these
records are the basis of Crenner’s fascinating
book. We do not have only Cabot’s
interpretation of the consultations, however.
Patients and referring doctors wrote to Cabot in
advance of, and after, the meetings, providing
alternative evidence of the dialogue that went
on and the different languages in use. It is
these other sources along with Cabot’s asides
that reveal Cabot dealing with disease and
suffering.
Crenner structures his study under the
umbrella of medical authority beneath which a
numberofdelicatelylinked,polarthemesshelter.
These include medical art and medical science,
bedsideandbench,andsubjectivesymptomsand
objective signs. Collapsing all these for a
moment, a great deal of the book illuminates the
issueofhowfartheworkofhealingcanbesaidto
be a success or failure by assessing patients’
accounts of their feelings in contrast to
employing objective measures of health and
disease. In what sense has the health of a person,
whocomplainsoflethargy,improvedwhenheor
she reports feeling ‘‘better’’ at the same time as
the doctor, who has diagnosed leukaemia, finds
the white cell count has worsened? The extreme
oppositecaseisembodiedinthefamousquipthat
the surgeon extirpated the disease but the patient
died. Indeed, a young man wrote to Cabot in
exactly that vein: ‘‘the operation itself was a
success’’ but ‘‘I have never recovered from the
check to my nervous system’’ (p. 100).
The light Crenner sheds on this in Private
practice emerges from his careful unfolding of,
and quotations from, the records. At the
behavioural level, in Cabot’s consultations, his
patients and to some extent Cabot himself
ignored the distinction. Doctor and client talked
to each other, swapping register as they went.
Patients complained about their aches and pains
but also, in one example, of an ‘‘accumulation
which gathers on the tubes’’ or in another
‘‘something trying to expel itself from my
uterus’’ (p. 86). Sometimes they conflated the
two.ABostontailorwrotetoCabot:‘‘Ithinkthat
everything is alright now as I don’t feel them
pains any more’’ (p. 115). Cabot for his part
recorded rigorous diagnoses such as ‘‘angina’’
but seemingly as a clinical observation also
reported the comment of a patient who said his
medication‘‘relieveshimasadream’’(pp.86–7).
Much of chapters 3 and 4 is taken up with the
mutual negotiations conducted through these
different languages.
However,andthisisthesecondenlightenment
tobefoundhere, itisclear thatCabotoften knew
that he was bilingual whereas his patients
co-opted pathological terminology to give wider
expressiontotheirfeelingsortocoerce,persuade
or blackmail their doctor (for example, into
prescribingsuchthingsas‘‘goatlymph’’,p.116).
Cabotseemstohaveseenwithabsoluteclarityin
many diseases a difference between these two
languages, one of which could be described as
moral and the other technical. Many doctors of
the period probably did not see the distinction
anywhere nearly soclearly or indeedwould have
accepted it as a basis for action when it was
pointed out to them. Moral languages were
integral to pathology. Defining diseases by race,
class, aptitude and attribute was central to
medicine. Terms like lazy, hardworking,
dissolute, irresponsible, backward, bright, dull
andsoonriddlethetextsofthetime.Towritelike
this betrayed no intellectual deficit among
doctors who had failed to see they had conflated
the moral and the natural. Moral languages were
constitutive of medicine because moral
management was part of the doctor’s job.
Helpingtheirpatients,encouragingthem,ticking
them off, putting an arm around their shoulders,
scolding their children was what doctors did and
what they expected, and were expected, to do.
Cabotwasseekingtobreakawayfromthisworld.
Good doctor though he was in one sense, in
another Cabot on occasion leaves me with the
feeling that, had he cared to express it, he might
have said that the ideal of healing was veterinary
medicine: technical skill grounded in biological
knowledge.
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themanagementofeveryaspectoftheirpatients’
lives were not simply acting on the basis of
unconsidered assumptions is beautifully brought
out by Crenner in his discussion of the
Massachusetts physician and professor of
hygiene, Alfred Worcester. In 1912 Worcester
published an article attacking the ways in which
the modern stress on diagnosis was being
favoured by doctors at the expense of their
traditional ‘‘knowledge of human nature’’. In
many cases, Worcester claimed, experience
would teach the physician what was beneficial
to the patient whereas the ‘‘luxury of
diagnosis’’ might bring only further misery to
a sufferer who could not be cured
(pp. 73–4). One can only imagine Cabot’s
horrified response.
In line with his rigorous vision of the
science-based clinical expert Cabot had no time
for placebos or, in theory at least, not telling
patients the truth about their disease. Cabot, says
Crenner, ‘‘tended to be blunt in communicating
news to his patients’’ (p. 113). This may have sat
comfortably with his personality but its origins
lay in his view that, according to Crenner,
‘‘obscuring ...information, even at the behest of
the family, represented a breach of duty’’ (p.
114). Symptomatic treatments, however, Cabot
could cope with when they seemed likely to
improve a patient’s physiological response to
disease (a proviso that permitted huge latitude in
prescribing).
Cabot’s hospital cases reveal his clinical style
to be that of a modern. The contingencies of
private practice have allowed evidence to be
preserved that shows that Cabot viewed many
acceptedaspectsofpracticeasthrowbacksandin
need of reform. This is not an anachronistic
judgement.Cabotwasquiteclearaboutthelimits
tobe drawn aroundthe physician’s job(there is a
sense in which he saw medicine as a highly
skilled occupation not an avuncular vocation).
Yetthisbigpictureisnottheonlyonethatcanbe
made from the material. When Crenner paints a
very detailed portrait of Cabot drawing on
contemporary cognitive and moral resources to
deal with conditions that are no longer
meaningful to us, we see an early twentieth-
century physician at work. This Crenner does in
chapter 5, ‘Nervous disease and personal
identity’. Cabot recognized that a large number
of the patients who came to him had a condition
that many would call nervous and which he
denotedby arange ofterms including‘‘debility’’
and ‘‘nervous exhaustion’’ and, on occasions,
‘‘overwork, loneliness, or high living’’ (p. 144).
Crenner observes that for Cabot ‘‘the relevance
of the personal and the social features of a
medical case might matter most in nervousness,
an area of medicine where the legitimate powers
of technical medicine seemed least applicable’’
(p. 142).
It is clear that from one perspective this
invasion of the biological realm by the human
condition troubled Cabot. Yet, from another, he
was a man immersed in contemporary moral
assumptions about disease. Crenner illustrates
this extremely well with Cabot’s utterly
unreflexive management of Jewish patients. The
latterwere foundby him tosufferfrom ‘‘Hebraic
debility’’ and ‘‘jew-neurasthenia’’ (p. 164). Jews
were not exceptional. Cabot’s management of
nervous diseases was riddled with assumptions
about the causal role of race, sex, culture, class
and occupation. I particularly liked his
idiosyncratic observation that ‘‘work in a rubber
factoryoftenproducesastubborntypeofgeneral
debility’’ (p. 169). But there is something of the
JekyllandHydeaboutCabot.Foreveninnervous
disease he strove throughout his career to bring
objective data to reign over subjective chaos. Dr
Jekyll, who began treating people with debility,
ended up as Mr Hyde, treating patients with
psychoneurosis.Psychicforcesclearlyseemedto
him much more like biological determinants of
disease than ennui.
As might be predicted, Cabot also held strong
views about the positive value of euthanasia.
There is, however, a twist here, for euthanasia
was also deeply entwined in his personal life.
This is a strange and powerful tale and it only
seems fair not to give away the ending, since
Crenner has carefully reconstructed and told a
moving story. On balance, however, the guess
must be that Cabot would have held the views he
did even without the personal, emotional
engagement with the question. With dying,
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whereanincurablediseasehadsetinwasmorein
his line. ‘‘Cabot’s observations on his own final
illness nearly swallow up his reflections on his
mortality’’, writes Crenner (p. 213).
There are a couple of oddities in this book,
neither of which detract substantially from a
thought-provokingvolume.Pages9–11aregiven
over to early twentieth-century discussion of
organic and functional disease. Crenner uses
functional to mean diseases that were
‘‘changeable and contingent, only subjectively
defined’’. They were defined by ‘‘exclusion’’ (p.
10) Two things are being confused here. Crenner
is quite right to say that this, the older use of
functional, was still in use in the early twentieth
century. Its synonyms were, neurotic,
unimportant, imaginary, not fatal and a source of
regular income in private practice. Strangely,
however,Crennercitesthe‘‘newcardiology’’,as
it was called, as an example of the move from
structural to functional in this period (p. 257
n.24).Butfunctionalinthisandotherspecialities
meant something entirely different to
‘‘subjectively defined’’. It derived from German
medicine and meant a physiological (usually
laboratory based) correlate of a symptom. Thus
cardiac arrthymia traceable on an
electrocardiograph (and ultimately, therefore,
referrable to an experimental animal) was a
functional change at the basis of heart failure; so
was acidosis, a biochemical parameter,
measurable in air hunger; so was
hyperchlorhydria in gastric ulcer and
hyperglycaemia in diabetes. When American
physicians (including David Edsall, Dean of
Harvard Medical School—Cabot’s own—no
less) came to London in the 1920s they were
appalled, they said, by the lack of functional or
dynamicorphysiologicalthinkingamongBritish
clinicians.ItseemslikelyCabotwouldhaveused
functional in the same sense as his Harvard
colleague although possibly also as a term of
abuse for an older way of describing disease.
Thisminorblemishisinnowayaspuzzlingas
Chapter7‘FromCabot’sdaytoours.Idealsofthe
Medical Relationship’. This is not a blemish;
thereisnothingwrongwithit,butmuchthelatter
part of it was surely an afterthought. The chapter
begins with a sophisticated and challenging
analysis of the late twentieth-century rise in
demandforinformedchoiceforpatients.Crenner
convincingly argues, and my summary will not
do him justice, that this is a consequence of a
rather more naked commodity-exchange
mechanism at work in modern medicine
manifested notably in specialization and the
circulation of patients among many doctors. In
reality, Crenner suggests, patients now have no
more or less informed choice than they did in
Cabot’s day, but at that time, when a single
physician often ministered to patients’ ills over a
lifetime, their powers of choice and consent
operated in other ways. Crenner then offers the
view, with which I concur, that after Cabot’s era
and before our own age of consumerism in
medicine, physicians ‘‘wielded a rather
unalloyed authority over their patients’’ and
‘‘promoted a paternalistic model of medical
decision-making’’ (pp. 233–4). So far so very
good but then Crenner, quite rightly I think too,
tries to theorize the shift from Cabot’s world to
our own. The last ten pages of the book describe
the gift exchange and commodity exchange
models of economic relationships famously
originated by Marcel Mauss. Crenner suggests
that using this ‘‘interpretive framework ...we
can examine the dynamics of the doctor–patient
relationships in different periods from Cabot’s
day to our own’’ (pp. 247–9). Good idea, it must
besaid,butwiththreepagesofthebooktogoand
these devoted to a summing up of ‘Cabot in
Context’, the theory is never used. Introduced at
the beginning of the volume and employed to
illuminate the rich detail that graces this book, it
would have been interesting but as a vestigial
appendage it is, to say the least, curious.
But what of my initial dilemma: the fact
that Cabot was, in one respect, a
biologically-informed technocrat as evidenced
by his hospital case histories, and the fact that, in
another, he is often remembered as being at the
forefront of those promoting a more person-
oriented or individual patient-centred approach
in the increasingly reductionist, disease-specific
world of academic medicine? That there was a
pronounced holist strand in the medicine of the
inter-war years seems clear. One of its most
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power of nature which was considered by many
physicianstobeaprocessfarmorepowerfulthan
their own science and art. This force—for so it
seemed to be—was valued highly by Cabot’s
Harvard colleague, Walter Bradford Canon, who
embedded it in his theory of homeostasis.
3 In
1936 Cabot jointly published a volume with
RussellLDicks,Theartofministeringtothesick.
Init,theauthorsciteCannon’sworkapprovingly,
but whereas Cannon attributed the wisdom of
homeostasis to nature, they state that they
‘‘believe’’ it originates from God.
4 (Cabot of
course would have very good reason to hold this
belief since, famously, among the Boston e ´lite,
the Cabots ‘‘talk only to God’’). I have read few
authors whoextolled the healing powerof nature
to quite the extent of Cabot and Dicks, and,
although their view was substantiated by
reference to the most modern physiology,
their admiration for the force bordered on the
natural theological. ‘‘The work of the kidney’’,
they wrote, ‘‘seems to us one of the most
wonderful things to be found anywhere on
earth.’’
5
Like the holism of a number of British
clinicians, the organicism of Cabot and Dicks
was closely tied to their vision of the doctor as
moral and medical generalist. They wrote: ‘‘We
whowritethisbookbelievesolittleinspecialism
that we would rather see doctors treat all their
patients’ ills, instead of turning some of them
over to the nurse, some to the social worker, and
some to the minister.’’ They lamented the
disappearance of ‘‘that almost mythological
being now extinct in many places’’ whom they
termed the ‘‘old-fashioned country
practitioner’’.
6YettoequatetheholismofBritish
consultants and the Boston physician is a crude
generalizationwhichmissesthepointasmuchas
it hits. British doctors looked to the past and,
although they embraced the new medical
sciences, many of them sought to stop the hands,
turnbackeven,theclockofthesocialrelationsof
academic medicine.
7 Cabot’s position seems
more complex. Whereas the British romantics
fled the shock of the new, Cabot accepted it and
embraced it. Like them, Cabot held that besides
diseasenarrowlyconstrued,apatient’swholelife
needs to be addressed in order for a satisfactory




8 This phrase suggests a corps of
scientifically-trained experts and is in harmony
with the ‘‘office’’ as the place of medical work
and the whole business-like turn of American
medicine. To many in Britain the idea of a
medical team or group practice was an alien one.
In respect of these things Cabot can be called
modern with some historical precision. Any
nostalgia for a mythologized medical past on
Cabot’s part was a private sentiment not a call to
conservative political action. Cabot, writes
Crenner, ‘‘saw himself as a reformer in an era of
progressive reform’’. In a world of weakening
‘‘social links of neighborhood, kinship, and
personal association’’ reformers ‘‘sought new
sources of organizational power in
professional expertise and technically derived
knowledge’’ (p. 29). This insight is never fully
used. Perhaps in the light of it, and in a book
which does so much to enhance
our understanding of the clinical encounter,
Crenner should have turned to Marx not Mauss
for the really big picture.
3See W R Albury and Steven J Cross, ‘Walter
B. Cannon, L. J. Henderson, and the organic
analogy’, Osiris, 2nd ser., 1987, 3: 165–92.
4Richard C Cabot and Russell L Dicks, The art of
ministering to the sick, New York, The Macmillan
Company, 1936, p. 119.
5Ibid, p. 123.
6Ibid, p. 7.
7Christopher Lawrence, ‘Edward Jenner’s Jockey
Boots and the great tradition in English medicine
1918–1939’, in Christopher Lawrence and Anna-K
Mayer(eds),RegeneratingEngland:science,medicine
and culture in inter-war Britain, Amsterdam, Rodopi,
2000, pp. 45–66.
8Cabot and Dicks, op. cit., note 4 above, p. 5.
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